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Gentlemen: 
CHINA'S FUTURE 
A lecture delivered by 
Dr. John Fairbank 
at the Naval War College 
October 31, 1949 
I have been a student of one of your earlier speakers, Dr. 
T. F. Tsiang, the present Chinese delegate to the United Nations. I 
have also been a subordinate in the Embassy in China under Mr. W. 
W. Butterworth of the State Department, another of your earlier
speakers. Consequently, I feel very fortunate that I appear here
after them. I speak as an historian w_ho has been associated with
social scientists. I have had about twenty years practice in trying
to deal with the Chinese scene in fifty-three minutes. This today,
will be briefer and so I will make it a bit condensed.
I am concerned with the historical and social science ap­
proach to China and our China problems. And I want to do three 
things: first, characterize the old Ch_inese society ; second, charac­
terize the process of revolution which is now turning that society in­
side out; and third, comment, from that point of view, on American 
relations with China, past, present and future. 
My main idea is that China is a different and unique social 
system or organization or society, a group of people living in a 
peculiar way of their own, and will continue to be so. And of 
course, I assume that the United States is also a unique social sys­
tem which will continue more or less in its own pattern. Neither 
Dr. John Fairbank is Professor of History, and Associate Chair­
man of the Committee on International and Regional Studies in 
charge of the China Area Program at Harvard University. He is the 
author of the book entitled, "The United States and China," which was 
published in 1948. 
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we nor they will change very greatly in our system of values, and 
the general trends of our development. 
My second idea is that China is in a state of revolution, by 
which I mean gradual social change, not just disorder, but change 
in the structure of the society, how it is put together, how the in­
dividuals fit into it, what they expect, how they motivate them­
selves in their daily lives'. . And, of course, I have to note that the 
· United States is in a process of change too. You may not call it
revolution but still it is a rapid social change in this country with
which we are more or less accustomed; we are developing. · So
these two societies are both moving along in streams of develop­
ment.
Now a third idea that I would put forward is that China is 
obviously .a factor in American security. It is desirable to keep 
China from being our enemy, but that approach to China, purely as 
a security problem, is not, it seems to me, the whole story. China 
has to be understood for itself, as it is. In other words, we have to 
maintain a high degree of objectivity. What is good for the Chinese 
people, comparatively speaking? What will they take? What will 
they do? It will be ineffective if we try to use China. I think our 
frame of reference should be that we are trying to work with 
.Chinese social forces, tQ influence the process of change in China, 
not merly to use it. I think we have fallen into trouble through the 
effort to use the situation without enough consideration about how 
the Chinese felt about it themselves. 
I have divided this presentation into two parts: first, the 
continuity of Chinese conditions and institutions; and second, the 
continuity of United States interest and policy. My effort is to es­
tablish the continuity or trend in China, and in this country in our 
relations to China, so as to make a projection toward the future-­
to foresee what our relations may be in days to come. 
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I begin, therefore, with the continuity of Chinese conditions 
and institutions ; and, as I said, I will take the first topic, the 
characteristics of the old traditional way of life; then come later to 
the question of revolution. Now this traditional way of life, I 
think, we have to take up under the four headings: economics, poli­
tics, sociology, ideology; these things that we use in our universities 
to make what analysis we can of how a society functions, what holds 
it together. I will go rapidly over these major topics which you 
are, to a considerable extent, well acquainted with. 
First of all, take the Chinese economy in the old traditional 
way of life. It was a rice economy, or at least an economy of in­
tensive agriculture, in South China, for example. Now this in­
tensive agriculture where you plant each blade of rice by hand, 
called for a very heavy application of manpower to a small amount 
of land and irrigation of that land with a heavy application of 
water. This technique gets maximum land use, intensively, through 
the heavy use of manpower. Manpower is cheap and you use lots of 
it, lots of people. By doing that, in this economy, you can main­
tain a self-sustaining mechanism-a lot of people living at a low 
level but feeding themselves by intensive agriculture, putting their 
manpower into small plots of land. Well, that results in a dense 
population and a crowded countryside. As you know, if you fly 
over China, you pass one plot of trees after another with fields in 
between. The trees are where farmhouses would be in Illinois or 
Iowa, but each of those clumps of trees is a village of two or three 
hundred people. Where it would be an American farm family, you 
have hundreds of people living on the land, using these half-acre 
plots apiece, and so that means a low standard of living. And the 
result of this economic situation over the centuries has been a low 
evaluation of the individual and a high evaluation of social order. 
The individual is cheap, there are lots of individuals, coolie labor 
is a glut; you can dispense with it, use it, throw it away. But because 
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there are lots of people and these people have to live together, 
there is a high evaluation put on maintaining social order, training 
persons to be orderly, to maintain their status, to be polite,-all 
these various things that you expect of Chinese. They live in a 
crowded situation that we are not acquainted with. 
Now turn to the sociology of this old society. Social struc­
ture is centered on the family as a unit, not on the individual. The 
whole system is reflected in the custom of arranged marriage, just to 
take one example. If you grew up in a Chinese family in the old style, 
your marriage is arranged · for you-you never see, before your 
marriage, the person you marry. The marriage is arranged between 
families, between your family and another; you are merely the tool 
of your family; you are used to create a marriage to carry on the 
family. That all ties in with ancestor worship and all these various 
things, as you know. This practice, of course, in the old family 
systems means a low evaluation of youth, as compared to age. The 
elders are the venerable respected people; they are closest to the an­
cestors who were also venerated. It also means a low evaluation of 
woman and a male domination; the woman goes out of her house­
hold into that of her husband. The husband stays in his hou�e­
hold. As the younger son, he gets married in the big courtyard of 
another house. Ideally, the daughter-in-law comes in; she is the 
stranger, the slave who works her way up in the new family. 
Now with that social system based on the family, there is 
another very striking characteristic of the old Chinese society­
that it is a bifurcated class structure. Well, that is a fancy name 
for the idea that there was a ruling stratum and a mass of peasantry 
below, say 80% of peasants living on the land in their farms and 
villages and above them a ruling stratum into which they might 
move, of course. There was nobility; you could rise if you were 
good, but on the whole people didn't too much. 
20 
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This ruling stratum was, you might say, a triangular arrange­
ment of three dominant groups. It is a very interesting thing to 
study because it had tremendous stability and is dying so hard to­
day. On the three different sides you had three different kinds of 
people. They all played ball together and were tied in with the 
families. On one side you had the landlord families, people who 
got a little surplus off the land. And maybe they weren't just 
grasping landlords; they would even till their own land, but still 
they got some surplus by renting out their land. So they had a 
little leisure; they didn't have to work all the time, at least their 
sons didn't have to work all the time. 
So the landlord class produced a second side of this tri­
angle, the scholar class. You had to have time as a boy to learn 
Chinese-it takes you a long time to do it at anytime. The land­
lord class produced scholars by studying the classics. And these 
scholars, in turn, produced the third side of this triangle, the of­
ficials, because from the scholars, as you know, the officials were se­
lected by the examination system. The triangle was complete when 
the official used his position to buy more land, and he could do it. The 
official was at the top in this society and thus maintained his land­
lord and landowner position. In this way the upper stratum main­
tained its ideology, its social organization, its values, its way of 
life with great stability over, as you know, 2,000 years, back to the 
unification of the Empire in 221 B. C. or another thousand years 
behind that through the period of Confucius and beyond. 
Now that meant that the peasant was out of government. 
The peasant did not participate in the activities of this ruling strat­
um and did not decide how much he would be taxed or anything 
of that kind. The affairs of state were the concern of the of­
ficial landlord-scholar type, the top class. On the other hand, 
you have to recognize that this old Chinese social structure left the 
21 
5
Fairbank: China's Future
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
government rather superficial. The peasant in his family units, in 
his villages, took care of himself, more or less; he just paid his 
taxes and the government was the rather thin upper crust over the 
surface of this vast mass of millions and millions of peasants. 
Now suppose we turn to the political structure of this old 
China. China was a unit secluded geographically from any com­
parable unit, so it was the universe, the Emperor, the Son of 
Heaven who ruled everything. Barbarians were round-about it, but 
there were no equals. The official class I have spoken of com­
prised a bureaucratic government which ran the Empire on be­
half of the Emperor using his prerogatives. 
Then there developed in the course of Chinese history an­
other very interesting political feature, namely that barbarians 
began to come into China and conquer the place periodically-a 
very interesting phenomenon and very important I think. The 
reason this was possible was that on the steppe in Inner-Mongolia 
where these barbarians lived as pastoral nomads, they developed a 
striking power, militarily, through the mounted archer, which the 
settled Chinese farmers couldn't withstand. One million, or maybe 
two million at most, of these steppe nomads, out on the desert, 
where it was too dry to cultivate anything with their type of cul­
ture, could send an army like that of the Mongols, or later the 
Manchus, into China and knife through any number of peasantry 
and conquer the country. A very amazing phenomenon that four 
hundred million, or maybe two hundred and fifty million in the 
old days of China, could be taken over by one or two million of 
these barbarian invaders. How did it happen? It happened several 
times in succession; the Chinese would make a comeback and then 
the barbarians would sweep in again a couple of hundred years 
later and stay for one hundred or two hundred years. The Chinese 
would throw them out, and they would come back in-a real se­
quence of this thing. 
22 
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So the Chinese dealing with the barbarian is part of Chinese 
history; it is part of Chinese society. It is an important factor of 
their political life-this constant question of how you deal with 
the strong, but uncultivated, barbarian menace. Of course, one 
thing to do is to play him off against other barbarians. When the 
Chinese were strong enough they did that. For century after cen­
tury they would deal with one group of Mongols and then deal 
with another group; they would back one against another in their 
tribal wars out in the desert on the steppe, and in that way would 
keep them neutralized, keep them harmless. But from time to 
time the steppe would become unified and then they'd.come in. The 
Mongols came in and ruled China for more than a century. The 
Manchus came in two centuries later, and they ruled China for two 
hundred and seventy-six years, a very long time. They did it, of 
course, by a combination of diarchy in administration; that is, 
rule by both groups, using Chinese as officials, as well as Manchus. 
And combined with that there was what you might call cultural 
symbiosis; that's a fancy word, but I think it is useful to express 
the idea that the two cultures were maintained separately, side 
by side. The Manchus kept their own culture, their own way of 
life, their distinct entity as Manchus; they didn't inter-marry, they 
didn't let the Manchus work. They kept them on stipends as 
warriors in garrisons, kept them separate, and only by keeping 
this small group of Manchus separate were they able to maintain 
that power so long. 
Now that resulted in a very interesting political tradition 
in China; namely, that the dynasty and the bureaucracy, the Em­
peror and his family and all the officials, stood together against 
the mass of people because they were the ruling group. The mass 
of the people were the people from whom you got the wherewithal 
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to maintain yourself; you took it out in taxes. The dynasty might 
be an alien dynasty, but the bureaucracy still would stick with it. 
That was a peculiar situation. The secret of that, I think, lies in 
this element of ideology. 
I'll move on to ideology, the ideology of Confucianism­
one of the neatest, most comprehensive, and most stable sets of 
ideas ever evolved for the establishment and maintenance of social 
order. The individual fitted into a status in society and was trained 
to know how he should behave at all times. Not the kind of 
training you know about here, because you train people within 
the framework of naval service, or military service, to know how 
to behave at all times in connection with your profession alone. 
Well, Confucianism is that sort of system in all aspects of life­
how the husband should behave toward his wife; how the same 
man as son should behave toward his father, or his mother-in-law, 
or his child; or how this man, as a subject, should behave toward 
his ruler. All this was worked out in minute detail and indoctrinated 
in the Chinese mind along with the learning of the language. You 
began to study Chinese by studying the Chinese language in the 
Classics. The Classics begin by giving you this ideology immed­
iately, so that you can't grow up, you can't become literate, with­
out absorbing this whole system of status, relationships, how you 
should behave-Confucianism, in short. As your mind develops, 
it is cast in that mold. 
The idea is still very strong in Chinese life that education 
is indoctrination in order to maintain the stability of social insti­
tutions including the political power of those who are ruling. Now, 
Confucianism was not one of these authoritorian despotisms. The 
Emperor was all powerful, but he had to act according to the 
rules of the game, just as any subject should act. According to 
the Confucian rules, the ruler was supposed to do the right thing 
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at the right time in an almost ritual manner. If he did the right 
thing he got tremendous prestige, and this prestige was believed 
to have a certain influence. His good conduct gave him power 
over the people. They would admit, when they saw his example, 
that he was a good man and should rule, and so moral prestige be­
came essential to the conduct of government. This rather super­
ficial, not very powerful, government ruled the mass of the peas­
antry by morale prestige, doing the right thing, therefore having 
the virtue which gave it the right to rule. That idea is still very 
strong. 
Now the revolutionary process hit this old society. Let me 
take that up as my second main consideration. The revolutionary 
process, which began in modern China in the last century, is gain­
ing momentum; things are happening faster and faster today. 
Let's look at it· economically, ideologically, socially, politically. 
To begin economically ,-of course, foreign trade came in and it 
produced an agrarian crisis, as it has in most countries. The 
farmer who had been producing his own cotton goods on his own 
little farm now began .. to find that Manchester and Lancashire 
cotton and later Japanese cotton goods or Indian cotton goods 
were splitting the China market. Finally, the factories came into 
China itself, in Shanghai, Japanese or British factories and some 
Chinese. When the farmer became dependent on the money econ­
omy, this new cotton goods knocked out the handicraft industry 
that had produced cotton for the farmer in the old days. Cities 
began to grow up and industrialization came in, and that led, of 
course, to a population increase, or a tendency toward population in­
crease, pressing. on subsistence. You know that kind of economic 
situation; it produces extreme poverty; we know and can under­
stand it; you just translate the material terms for yourself and 
you've got the economic picture. The thing we neglect, I think, 
is the sociological and ideological side that goes with it. 
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Well what happens sociologically? The family was pretty 
hard hit. Why? Because in the old days the family was a self­
contained unit; you functioned in it, working for it, living from it, 
without any personality problem or wage problem or ownership 
of property. Everything was in common in the family; you worked 
in the field, you ate at the table, your father died, you succeeded 
him, no money changed hands. Now in the new China, industriali­
zation comes in. If you are in the city, or even in the country, 
you do something for wages; money payments come in. If you 
are a working individual, you get paid a wage; you are independ­
ent of your family, independent of this little microcosm you form­
erly would have lived in. And so the family doesn't have quite 
its old cohesion. The mother-in-law can't control the daughter-in­
law, when the daughter-in-law makes her own wages. The husband 
can't control the wife, when the wife is working somewhere in the 
city-his old control breaks down. Then freedom of marriage comes 
along. That is just another symptom, in contrast to the old ar­
ranged marriage, and so you get a youth movement. The young 
people begin to break away from the old family system. They 
say, "Age should not receive the only veneration; we are students 
and scholars; though young, we deserve a chance to live our own 
lives." The young students also use this old prerogative of the 
scholar being top dog. It used to be the old man who had time to 
learn everything in the classics, but now the scholar is the young 
student, still the scholar, but young. 
At the same time you break down the family, you break 
down the old landlord system. The old landlord class begins to
become an absentee landlord class. You move to the city, nowa­
days, if you are of this old scholar-gentry on the land. When you 
move to the city you are out of touch with the peasants, you do 
things for them impersonally that you used to do by personal con­
tact, mediating their disputes, helping them in some of their 
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problems. · The good side of the landlord-tenant relationship breaks 
down when you are an· absentee; you just squeeze them for what 
they have to pay you in rent. Thus, peasant disorder more easily 
comes up. There are other reasons for peasant revolutions, but 
peasant revolution comes along. It comes in a Chinese cycle; 
actually, every two or three centuries peasant revolution has come 
in the past, in the course of things. It began about 1850 last time in 
China and is still there to use. Now this results in a great op-. 
portunity, socially speaking; the opportunity to use the new eman­
cipated youth of China for the purpose or organizing the formerly 
inert peasantry of China, and that is the combination the Commun­
ists have got. Before them, of course, the Kuomintang had . it; 
that is the combination that wins, because you organize this enor­
mous manpo:wer through it. 
In politics, let us look at this revolutionary process in China. 
The first thing was a response to the West by imitating the West. 
The West was powerful, therefore you must imitate it; you be­
come nationalistic, you act toward the West in the same way as the 
West acts toward itself or toward you ; you have a consciousness 
of China as a nation among other nations for the first time, instead 
of being the whole empire and universe with nothing but barbarians 
around. And so you knock out the old dynasty, you kick out the 
Manchus who are foreigners after all, and set up a Republic in 
1911. Well, that's the first phase. In response to the West, ChinesP. 
nationalism rose against the Manchus at last, knocking out the 
dynasty. Then the question comes up, how do you set up this new 
Chinese Republic back in 1911 ? You try the democratic process, a 
parliament and cabinet government with a president and all the 
stuff that the British were using. The British was the top, nation 
at that period--even the Americans were using it. So you try 
that; it doesn't work,- Why? Well, China is a different society; 
it is not that kind of society; there is no way in the world of making 
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parliaments work in China at that time. The old situation breaks 
down, Sun Yat-sen fails. The war lords take over and in the old 
Chinese style move in after the dynasty walks out, grabbing a little 
area in each part of China as before. 
What finally happens as the solution of reorganizing the new 
China under the Republic? Well, you know the answer-party 
dictatorship was picked up by Sun Yat-sen. He was anti-Russian, 
on the whole, but was willing to cooperate with anybody. He didn't 
believe in Communism; but he used one of its principles for organ­
izing the new China, namely, the selected group, the party dicta­
torship. The new elite stratum would take over the government 
just as the official class used to, and operate things nominally for 
the good of the peasant in the way the official class used to, carrying 
on the old tradition in a new form. Of course, it is also a new tradi­
tion, but it can't be a Western style parliamentary government. It's 
a party dictatorship that hangs together, following a leader; it has 
these Fascist, European-style or Communist-type overtones. Chiang 
Kai-shek became the leader; he set up his regime with himself at 
the top of the triangle of the party, the army, and the government'. 
These three things he stood on; he was at the top of each. That 
was the system that organized China under the Kuomintang. Now 
it is very interesting to see, of course, that it is really the Soviet 
system, in a certain formal way; it is interesting to see that the 
Communists today carry on very much the same system. You can 
either say they got it from the Russians, or you can say they got 
it from the Kuomintang who got it from the Russians, or you could 
even find some evidence that Sun Yat-sen was working it out for 
himself before he took the Russian example, before the Russian 
revolution. We shouldn't say this is just the Russian influence. 
There is something in the Chinese scene that allows a party to come 
in and take the place of the old dynasty, or the old foreign invader; 
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this selected group that runs things. That appears to be happening 
today. 
Now what happened ideologically in this revolutionary pro­
cess? Of course they began studying the West, the United States 
-students coming here, using liberalism, individualism, the doc­
trines that made the West so strong. But then they found that in
their crowded country they had a low standard of living, with all
their traditions and different social context; liberalism didn't work
out. It was insufficient to maintain and develop the degree of social
order which they wanted. The whole idea of Western individual­
ism seemed rather chaotic and anarchic. And today, when Secre­
tary Acheson puts out his cover letter to the White Paper and re­
fers to the fact that we will continue to hope for the triumph of
the forces of "democratic individualism" in China, it proves to be
a great mistake to say it. "Democratic individualism" is a golden
word to us, I think, but it is a garbage word in China because they
associate with this term individualism-the whole experience they
had of the western invasion breaking up the family, leaving the
average Chinese isolated without all these relationships that he was
accustomed to having, atomized-incapable of doing anything by
himself, so that he had to join a party if he was going to get re­
sults. All that idea is in their minds. So "individualism" is not
the good thing we think it is, where the individual expresses him­
self and his personality. In China, it is a factor for disorder and
difficulty and breakdown; they are against it. "Democratic individ­
ualism" therefore, they immediately translated their way. They
:ran editorials on it for weeks afterward and are still doing it,
using it against us. They don't like it.
The Chinese Communists obviously have combined these in­
gredients in the Chinese scene. They show the most promise of 
anybody in recent decades of setting up a strong political order. 
29 
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They have been using the peasant revolution on the land. Now, 
of course, they have turned the corner; they say they will have to 
industrialize, so henceforth it is a question of how much they can 
get out of the peasant, how far they can squeeze him. TI,iey will 
have peasant trouble from now on. Still they were able to use 
the breakup of the old family, the breakdown of the old landlord­
gentry class, to put their own system in. It is a modification by 
which you are loyal, not to the family so much as to the party. So 
you join up. And where the gentry does not run things locally the 
party does, in this new way of organization. They are committed to 
industrialization and they proclaim themselves intensely national­
istic. That, of course, is a tough question-how far it is possible to 
combine a genuine Chinese nationalism with the Marxist ideology 
sent from Moscow. Of course we immediately say, "How about 
Titoism ?" Mao Tse-tung immediately comes out saying, "The hell 
with Tito!" 
Now that is, I think, a Chinese situation. In other words, 
what Mao Tse-tung says is for political purposes. Personally, I 
don't know whether China is going to be run by the Russians or 
not, aside from the fact that they are all Marxists. 
Well, in this situation there are continuing elements. A poor 
dense population, facing famine in the year ahead because of the 
disastrous floods and famine in North China and on the Yangtse, is 
likely to be governed by a bureaucratic official class, a selected 
elite, in this case organized by the Communist party and likely to be 
strongly pro-Chinese. However, they may work it out with a 
tradition of alien influence and alien rule. 
Now, let us look briefly at the American policy in relation 
to this Chinese scene. Our contact with China began in our seek­
ing access for trade in 1784. And we got a treaty and extra­
territoriality to give us greater access for trade in 1844. This idea 
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of access for trade developed in the "open door", which was as 
much British as American. The open door for trade in 1899 de­
veloped further into the idea for independence and integrity of 
China. So this idea of Chinese integrity and independence is more 
�. than a merely economically motivated idea on our part. Our trade
=· . with China has actually been rather small most of the time. We
ii.· 
have also had extensive missionary and humanitarian interests in 
China. Part of our own democratic faith has found expression in 
hoping that we could help the Chinese to get what we regard as 
benefits from democracy, the American way of life. We have been 
expansive in the 19th and 20th centuries. We have also developed 
a certain sympathy I think for the Chinese personality-there is 
something about the Chinese individual toward which we feel 
rather sympathetic. He is in difficulty, he has a sense of humor, 
he is very civilized, he understands people. We get on with him 
usually, we understand his vices, we admire his virtues. It has 
been this friendliness which is not just an economic imperialistic 
ambition but also a matter of actual sentiment between peoples. 
That is our background of a pretty good record, made pos­
sible, most likely, because the British did the dirty work in the 
19th century. They fought the wars; we came along behind and 
took the opportunities. We didn't get on the spot until recently as 
the representative of the West. The British were the great West­
ern representatives before. They took the rap in 1926 when China 
was feeling anti-foreign. It was anti-British. Now, of course, it 
is anti-American. 
Up against this new situation-this new power with which 
we finished the last war, power on the Chinese scene because of the 
troops and armament that we have there, we preceded to make a 
series of errors. We made some good tries, but we also made 
some errors. And our problem now, it seems to me, is to study 
our post-war record against the background of Chinese conditions 
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and traditions and to chart a new course, not willfully, but with as 
much preception of these long term trends as we can. For that 
purpose the White Paper was put out, aside from the necessity of 
shutting off the Republicans. The White Paper was very bad 
news for us in China. The covering letter by Mr. Acheson played 
the document as though we had always been for Chiang Kai-shek 
when General Marshall was mediating. The Communists have· 
jumped on that; they have said that the White Paper proved that 
General Marshall never was a mediator at all-which is their propa­
ganda lie, doing the paper injustice of course. In general, we have 
wiped our feet on the Nationalist government without, on the other 
hand, ingratiating ourselves with the Communists. Nobody wants 
to ingratiate himself with the Communists; it doesn't work out. But 
either way you take it, we haven't made much progress in China 
with the White Paper. You have to recognize that it probably was 
not a help to put it out. Therefore, we have to capitalize on the 
advantage it gives us in our own thinking at home, because it 
does give us the record. And don't let anyone tell you, like Con­
gressman Judd, that anything is suppressed and ought to be there 
that isn't. It is true the military record is not built up because that 
was not in the State Department's problems. The White Paper 
gives you the story condensed in a thousand pages. It ought to 
be studied, and our great opportunity in having it is that we can 
use it for purposes of study. 
So I proceed now to name what I think are some of the 
errors which you can document from this body of documentation: 
Error number one, American sentimentality or wishfulness and 
hopefulness about China during the war, the big build-up about 
freeing China, the great heroic effort that was going on. But 
actually, it was a pretty tough spot for the poor Chinese to be in, 
and a lot of individual graft went on. People were trying to save 
themselves from inflation. We built up a fine picture and came 
32 
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 2, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss2/3
RESTRICTED 
out with this policy that China must be one of the big five, and we 
must help China to become strong, united, and democratic at the 
end of the war. Therefore, we had a great hope, I think, which was 
unrealistic at the end of the war, to start us off on our activities 
in China. 
Secondly, we showed bad judgment. We didn't look at the 
facts of the local situation when we refused to see that Chiang 
Kai-shek was on the way out, that he was going to lose to the 
Communists sooner or later. His system wasn't getting the basis 
of power in China in the form of a peasantry which it could use 
for taxes and an army. On the other hand, the Communists with 
their syst�m, were getting the basis of power because they could 
use the peasantry to support an army and that would give the game 
to the Communists. We refused to see that. We thought we were 
so powerful we could change that ; we didn't realize how difficult 
it is to get into China. You can get to the coast, you can get to 
the main cities, but you can't get inland. Logistically it is a night­
mare. 
Error number three: I think we were rather naive, because 
we put our faith in material things and, I think we all realize 
upon reflection that no social revolution, no process in the change 
of a society, the way people live together, and what they believe 
in and how they act toward one another, no process of that kind 
is purely a material matter. You may be able to slow it down by 
raising the standard of living and filling the belly, but that doesn't 
solve all problems. And we had a good deal of faith that by ma­
terial means we could turn the course of the Chinese revolution-by 
arms, for instance. It was probably unlucky that we had so many 
arms on the Chinese scene, destined for many Chinese armies we had 
been training against Japan and continued-about half of them­
in the Lend-Lease pipeline after the end of the war, as we did in no 
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other part of the world. We kept feeding in equipment to these 
Chinese troops. As a result, the Chinese Communists today have 
a better-armed army, with American equipment, than the Chinese 
ever had. But they are an anti-American army. The arms moved 
right through the Chiang Kai-shek troops which didn't have the 
morale to keep them. They were much easier to sell. The Chinese 
Nationalists had nothing to fight for which would keep them from 
selling arms when they got in a jam, or surrendering them when 
they were surrounded. And so this whole process went on, which is 
recorded by General Barr and others in the White Paper. For ex­
ample, Chiang Kai-shek's troops, being on the defensive psychologi­
cally, would stay in the cities and on the railroads, as the Japanese 
did. In the cities they had their artillery, but you can't use artillery 
against the countryside. The Communists had no command posts, 
no dumps, nothing you could hit. They were scattered around the 
peasantry. You couldn't use the artillery of the United States to 
defeat the Communists. Eventually, the Communists began to cap­
ture this artillery, they bought up some of it. Then they were in 
clover, because they could use artillery against fortified strong 
points. And, when the Communists began to get some American 
artillery and turn it on the little cities and outposts, Chiang Kai­
shek's troops were finished. 
Error number four was, I think, a wrong emphasis or wrong 
proportion in our aid program to China. We put arms and eco­
nomic aid first. We didn't have any way of dealing with the 
social situation or the sociological changes. What do you do with 
youth? What do you do with emancipated women? The Com­
munists organized them, meanwhile, and we were sitting on the 
sidelines. We didn't do much ideologically. We talked about our 
own ideals, which are excellent, which apply to our country, and 
which we maintain and defend. Yet those ideals do not exactly 
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apply, in our terms, to the Chinese peasant. They must be trans­
lated somehow; and we haven't found out how to do it yet. 
Error number five: We were inexperienced about what could 
be done. For the Chinese economy we thought we could send much 
more aid than we could. We found that a backward, undeveloped 
economy like China could not absorb the economic aid we sent. You 
could get it to the dock; you might get into the warehouse, or across 
the river at Shanghai, at a cost equal to the cost of a shipment to 
New York, but you couldn't get it up country. When you got it up 
country, you couldn't use the machinery we had put in. For ex­
ample, we had a system of workshops for producing iron tools for 
the farmer to improve his tools and production. We had a big work­
flhop and tool plant for each province. One of the tool plants was 
coming in crates off a barge; and you had to have a cement founda­
tion for the tools. This meant a big local outlay, a lot of expense, 
increasing the inflation and placing a heavy burden on the local 
people to provide the foundation, even before you got the crates 
unpacked. To get into production you have to train operators and 
find them also. 
Furthermore, we lacked experience in regard to the Chinese 
political tradition. We didn't understand the mandate of Heaven. 
The mandate of Heaven is an old Confucian conception, engraved 
in Chinese psychology, like the election process in the United 
States. One candidate in our presidential election gets a few more 
votes. He may actually get less votes, but he still gets more 
electoral votes, as at times in the past. He gets a few more votes 
and the rest of the country the next morning says, "He is the Presi­
dent." That's the majority rule, a bare majority sometimes. That is 
our custom. The mandate in Heaven is comparable. The idea is 
that, when a new contender for the supreme power obviously has 
popular support organized by using a combination of persuasion 
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and compulsion to work on the peasantry; he is nice to them; and 
those who are nice to you, you knock off, and there are others who 
are still nicer to you, and there are fewer of them to knock off. You 
get them lined up; you get them organized, and so on. When a 
· 1eader in China has done this, there comes a point where he has
the mandate of Heaven. He is in-he is the new dynastic organizer.
That situation came back last Christmas. Chiang Kai-shek has
been out ever since. When the leader is out, he is completely out,
and it is just a case of clean up. So it has been impossible for
us, whatever efforts we have made, to build up any strength against
the Communists.
I think we have to be more consicious of our own type of 
strength, our own type of society-its own virtue. And it is a 
virtue in my view that consists of pluralism which, I feel, is a fancy 
word for a lot of agencies or expressions of power in the state, or 
having a diversified situation where there is no one dominant force, 
as exhibited in our having not only a public sector of government 
enterprises, but a private sector of private enterprises. And some­
times they are pretty big, but, nevertheless, these big corporations 
which the Marxists stare at as monopoly capitalism, are not govern­
ment. They are something different and provide a sort of balance, 
so that we have in our system an element of strength with the 
balance which we have from a number of different agencies on the 
same level. And that, I think, goes with our whole concept of the 
rule of law, including private property, which safeguards the indi­
vidual in his self expression. There is an idea there of not having 
the monolithic state where the party is a dictatorship, where the 
state does all the industrializing and· the like. This doesn't mean 
that I am anti-socialist or pro-socialist. I think we are moving 
along in a progression (this is just my personal view)-progression 
where we are developing an increasing degree of government en­
terprise. But I think it is important for us to keep in mind this 
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principle of a balance among the forces in our society so that no 
one agency, association, or group is dominant. 
Now, when we look at the Chinese scene, and most of the 
other Asiatic countries, it is perfectly obvious that they are not in 
such a situation and they cannot be, no matter how much we try. 
Say we are going to help the middle class; it isn't the same thing. 
And they are not our kind, in these sociological terms; there is 
nothing much we can do about it. They do have this tradition of 
the official class running things. The Japanese have it, and getting 
them away from the idea is going to take a long time. We have 
to compromise in a statesman-like sense, of retaining our own ob­
jectives and:our own values and yet not assuming that we can make 
them prevail in the near future. You can't just go out and Ameri­
canize Asia. When you do, you stub your toe as we have in the 
recent past, unless, of course, you look around for the person who 
will play ball with us, who does subscribe to American principles. 
You find a Syngman Rhee in Korea or a Chiang Kai-shek in China. 
Our danger is that we are too ambitious about this, that we go in 
and support these people and say, "You've got to choose-this is our 
man. He is most like us, at least. he is not a Communist, so we will 
support him." Well, I'm afraid of that, as a practical matter, not 
being effective. I think it is not going to work too well, if we are 
too ambitious about it. It works something like this. Chiang Kai­
shek is on the spot, with a very tough post-war situation, inflation, 
many difficulties to overcome, everybody unhappy; and, if he does 
certain things to try to win peasant support, maybe he can under­
cut the Communists. He has had his chance for twenty years; it's 
still there, but in 1945 and 1946 we came along and we said, "Yes, 
you must make these reforms and we will give you a lot of aid." 
And . he says to himself, consciously or unconsciously, "O. K., I'll 
take.the aid and won't have to make the reforms, because if I make 
the reforms, I will be out, so I will take the aid." So the more aid 
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ground. We don't know very much about it-it's pretty hard to get 
the story out-but we know perfectly well that Manchuria is the key 
to the industrialization of China. It is the key to the future stand­
ard of living of the Chinese people, and the Russians are sitting on 
it because they can use it. 
Now here is this famine coming in China next May probably, 
whether or not we hear about it. Manchuria, the big bread basket 
of North China, is the place which can produce a crop surplus. The 
Russians want that extra food in Siberia where the soil is too poor 
and doesn't produce enough food. Who's going to get the food 
out of Manchuria,-North China or the Russians? Well, we'll wait 
and see. In other words, we should play this-not as a doctrinaire, 
ideologolical knock-down and drag-out, which is likely to lose us 
Asia-but as power politics. The Russians are a gang; they are in 
there for what they can get, and we don't have to get so much. We 
can be more friendly; we can give more. Now that calls for a cer­
tain amount of self-control on our part, because our doctrinaire atti­
tude, I think, toward Communism has gone beyond the point of 
careful calculation; it has gone to a sentimental or emotional point­
we don't like Communism- it represents all these things, all these 
uncertainties and things we don't like, police states, and what they 
are doing in Czechoslovakia, and all that. We sum it up in our 
anti-Communism. Rightly so, but this is not an expert ideology. 
Mere anti-Communism is not enough to off er Asia. 
I think that we are backward in our ideological approach to 
Asia. We know all about logistics and shipping equipment and 
arming and everything else; we can do all these material things; we 
are the masters of them. But as yet, we haven't got the ideological, 
political, social, or social science understanding of how to get these 
people's minds moving in a direction that we can go along with. 
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we give him, the less he has. to make reforms, the less capable he 
is of competing with these Communists, or other people who are 
out organizing the peasantry on the countryside through reform. 
In effect, we give him the "Kiss of Death" to some extent. We can 
do that in any country in Asia, if we go in too heavily. We have got 
to figure out some way of trying to support a non-Communist situ­
ation without actually creating it. We can't back the status quo; 
we can't put people in positions where they rely on us and become, 
as the Communists say, "Running dogs of the American Imperial­
ists", in the eyes of their own people, which discredits them and 
pushes them out. 
To throw this out as a point-I think we are not going to 
get very far with a big anti-Communism ideological line in Asia. 
I think we will get a lot farther with an anti-Russian ideological 
line. In other words, we should avoid being doctrinaired. 
Now it is very good for us to work out our own doctrines, 
our own faith, what we believe in in this country. Obviously, this 
country isn't going Communist. We want to understand what our 
ideology is and express it, believe it, but, when it comes to Asia, 
Asia is so different and is so close to being a setup for the Com­
munists, I think we would do well to lay off Communism and lay on
Russia. You see Communism is the fine dream. It is the thing 
you can do in �sia-to knock off the landlord or kick out the in­
vader, who is the imperialist by Communist definition. Commun­
ism is a pretty good thing. to the poor down-trodden Asiatic, just 
as an ideology to dream about, to work for. "All stand together 
and we will have a new day; we'll liberate; everything will be 
fine." It works as a rallying point, and attacking it, I don't think, 
is our strong point. On the other hand, if we go in for an anti­
Russian line, we've got all kinds of material. There are the Russians 
sitting in Manchuria, doing all kinds of dirty work in the back-
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ground. We don't know very much about it-it's pretty hard to get 
the story out-but we know perfectly well that Manchuria is the key 
to the industrialization of China. It is the key to the future stand­
ard of living of the Chinese people, and the Russians are sitting on 
it because they can use it. 
Now here is this famine coming in China next May probably, 
whether or not we hear about it. Manchuria, the big bread basket 
of North China, is the place which can produce a crop surplus. The 
Russians want that extra food in Siberia where the soil is too poor 
and doesn't produce enough food. Who's going to get the food 
out of Manchuria,-North China or the Russians? Well, we'll wait 
and see. In other words, we should play this-not as a doctrinaire, 
ideologolical knock-down and drag-out, which is likely to lose us 
Asia-but as power politics. The Russians are a gang; they are in 
there for what they can get, and we don't have to get so much. We 
can be more friendly; we can give more. Now that calls for a cer­
tain amount of self-control on our part, because our doctrinaire atti­
tude, I think, toward Communism has gone beyond the point of 
careful calculation; it has gone to a sentimental or emotional point­
we don't like Communism- it represents all these things, all these 
uncertainties and things we don't like, police states, and what they 
are doing in Czechoslovakia, and all that. We sum it up in our 
anti-Communism. Rightly so, but this is not an expert ideology. 
Mere anti-Communism is not enough to off er Asia. 
I think that we are backward in our ideological approach to 
Asia. We know all about logistics and shipping equipment and 
arming and everything else; we can do all these material things; we 
are the masters of them. But as yet, we haven't got the ideological, 
political, social, or social science understanding of how to get these 
people's minds moving in a direction that we can go along with. 
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